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ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS• AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants

claim

Plaintiffs1

did

not

allege

"factual

allegations" to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. Df
Reply Br p. 35. This is not true. Plaintiffs set forth on page 95
of their brief some of those factual allegations contained in the
amended complaint. They include the following factual allegations:
1.

Defendants knew Utah's taxation scheme violated § 111 yet

continued to represent to Plaintiffs that they need not file a
claim for refund.
2.

R. 92.

Defendants, knowing Utah's taxation scheme was unlawful,

proceeded to collect taxes from Plaintiffs for the 1988 tax year.
R. 95.
3.

Defendants,

by

releasing

inaccurate

and

misleading

information between March 28, 1989 and April 17, 1989, denied
Plaintiffs the equal protection, privileges and immunities provided
under the Constitution or laws of the United States. R.97.
A clear reading of Plaintiff's amended complaint indicates
Plaintiffs are seeking relief under § 1983 only for the 1988 tax
year. Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges the actions committed
by the individual Defendants in their individual capacities during
1989 deprived Plaintiffs of their rights, privileges and immunities
secured by the Constitution for the 1988 tax year. Plaintiffs have
not made the same allegations against the individual defendants for
the other tax years.

These allegations, presumed to be true for

purposes of a motion to dismiss, give rise to a § 1983 action.
1

II.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO FULL RELIEF UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 is the principal vehicle for private enforcement

of federal law against state officials.1

In Monroe v.

Pape,

365

U.S. 167 (1961), the Court identified the purposes of § 1983 as:
(1) overriding any state law which conflicted with the remedies
available under § 1983; (2) providing a remedy when the state
remedy was inadequate; and (3) providing a federal remedy where the
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice.

Id.

at 173-74.

The Court also held that § 1983

supplements state-created remedies stating that "ftlhe federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."
Id.

at 183. (emphasis added).
State courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with

federal courts over § 1983 actions.

Martinez

v.

California,

444

U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980). Moreover, the United States Constitution
requires state courts to enforce federal claims such as § 1983. In
Testa

v. Katt,

330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947), the United States Supreme

Court held that state trial courts generally

cannot decline

enforcement of a federal claim because such a refusal would fly "in
the face of the fact that the States of the Union constitute a
nation" and would disregard the "purposes and effect of" the
1

42 USC § 1983 provides in pertinent part: "Every person, who
under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit and
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Id.

at 389. The Court also

made it clear that "the obligation of states to enforce . . .
federal laws is not lessened bv reason of the form in which they
are cast or the remedy which they provide." Id.

at 391. (emphasis

added).
A.

Consistent With The Supreme Court's Recent Holdings, a
Violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 is Actionable Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.

In their reply brief (p. 35) Defendants state that a violation
of 4 U.S.C. § 111 is not actionable under § 1983 against officials
who reasonably rely on existing law unless their conduct violates
a clearly established right.

Under the United States Supreme

Court's holdings, a violation of § 111 is actionable under § 1983.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the coverage of [§
1983] must be broadly construed." Golden
City

of Los Angeles,

Casey,

State

Transit

Corp.

v.

493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989), See e.g. . Felder

v.

487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988); Maine v. Thiboutot,

(1980).

484 U.S. 1, 4

Section 1983 "provides a remedy 'against all forms of

official violation of federally protected rights.'" Golden
Transit

Corp.

v.

City

of

Los

Angeles,

493 U.S. 103, 106

State
(1989).

The Court has specifically stated: "As the language of the statute
plainly indicates, the remedy encompasses violations of federal
statutory as well as constitutional rights."

Jd. at 105.

The Supreme Court has stated that, in determining whether a
violation of a federal statute like 4 U.S.C. § 111 is actionable
under § 1983, only two inquiries are to be undertaken by the trial
court:

(1) whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a
3

federal right; and (2) whether the defendants have proven that
Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.

Id.

also Middlesex

Clammers

Ass'n,

County

Sewerage

Auth.

v.

453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981); Pennhurst

Halderman,

National
State

School

Sea

See

& Hosp.

v.

451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
1.

Plaintiffs have Asserted a Violation of a Federal
Right.

With respect to the first inquiry, the Court has explained
that a federal statute creates an enforceable right under § 1983 if
the statute allegedly violated imposes obligations binding upon
state officials to either act or refrain from acting in a certain
manner as opposed to expressing merely a "congressional preference
for certain kinds of treatment."
citing Pennhurst,

Golden State,

493 U.S. at 106,

451 U.S. at 19.

The decision of Davis

v. Michigan

Dep't

of Treas.,

489 U.S.

803 (1989) , leaves no doubt that § 111, from the date of enactment
of the Public Salary Tax Act, imposed a binding obligation upon
state

officials

to

tax

federal

civilian

retirees

in

a

nondiscriminatory fashion.2 Moreover, it is manifestly clear that
§ 111 was intended to benefit the Plaintiffs.
Court in Davis,

As noted by the

"[s]ection 111 by its terms applies to 'the

taxation of pay or compensation for personal services as an officer
or employee of the United States.1"
2

Davis

at 808 (emphasis

Section 4 U.S.C. § 111 provides in pertinent part that "[t}he
United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for
personal service as an officer or employee of the United States .
. . by a duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if
the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee
because of the source of pay or compensation."
4

added).

The Court went on to state that the nondiscrimination

clause of 4 U.S.C. § 111 was designed to prohibit discriminatory
taxation of "retired federal civil servants." Id.

at 809-10. The

Court emphasized that, while intergovernmental tax immunity is
based, in part, upon the need to protect the federal governmental
operations from undue interference:
[I]t does not follow that private entities or individuals who
are subjected to discriminatory taxation on account of their
dealings with the sovereign cannot themselves receive the
protection of the constitutional doctrine.
Indeed, all
precedent is to the contrary.
Id.

at 814 (emphasis added).
2.

Defendants Cannot Prove Congress Foreclosed a §
1983 Remedy.

Second, when a violation of a federal statute is cognizable
under § 1983, "the defendant may show that Congress 'specially
foreclosed

a

remedy

under

§

1983'

. . .

by

providing

a

'comprehensive enforcement mechanis[m] for protection of a federal
Golden

right."'

State,

493 U.S. at 106 (citations omitted).

Section 111 does not contain any remedial mechanism, let alone a
comprehensive scheme. Nor do defendants suggest the contrary. The
"burden to demonstrate that Congress has expressly withdrawn the [§
1983] remedy is on the defendant."

Id.

at 107.

"'We do not

lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on §
1983 as a remedy' for the deprivation of a federally secured
right."
Auth.,

Id.

quoting Wright

v. Roanoke Redevelopment

and

Housing

479 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1987) (emphasis added). Under current

case law, a violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 is actionable under § 1983.

5

B.

Plaintiffs1 § 1983 Damage Claim Against Defendants in
their Individual Capacity is not Barred by Sovereign
Immunity or the Eleventh Amendment.

Defendants have been sued in their individual and official
capacities.

Plaintiffs1 § 1983 damage claim is brought against

Defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs1 claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief were brought against Defendants
in their official capacities.
real

party

in

interest with

Defendants argue the State is the
respect

to

Plaintiff's

§

1983

individual capacity damage claim. Df Reply Bf p. 39.
Plaintiffs1 amended complaint unequivocally demonstrates that,
as to their § 1983 damage claim, Plaintiffs seek to impose personal
liability upon the Defendants as individuals.

The state treasury

will remain unaffected by any judgment against the Defendants in
their individual capacity, unless the state elects to indemnify the
officials.
1.

Plaintiffs'
§
1983
Damage
Claim
can
be
Characterized as an Individual Capacity Action Even
if One Assumes the Defendants were Carrying Out a
Policy of the State.

As stated above, Plaintiffs1 § 1983 damage claim only seeks to
impose personal liability on Defendants. Consequently, any further
inquiry into the characterization of the § 1983 damage claim as an
"official" or "individual" capacity claim is unnecessary. However,
because Defendants claim the individual Defendants are "being sued
in their official capacities", Df Reply Br p. 38, Plaintiffs will
address this issue.
In Farid

v.

Smith,

850 F.2d 917 (2nd Cir. 1988), a prison

inmate brought a § 1983 damage claim against the superintendent of
6

a

New

York

State

correctional

facility

for

unconstitutional

confiscation of property. The complained of confiscation was made
by the state official pursuant to a mailroom policy promulgated by
the state.

The state official argued that the inmatefs action

could only be characterized as an official capacity action because
the policy was promulgated

by the state as opposed

to him

personally. Therefore, the state official argued that the Eleventh
Amendment barred recovery.
The court initially noted that, "[t]he eleventh amendment...
does not protect [a state official] from personal liability if he
is sued in his 'individual1 or 'personal1 capacity."

Id.

at 921.

The court then addressed the state official's argument as follows:
[E]ven if [a state official] were to prove that he was merely
carrying out a policy of the state, he would not be protected
from personal liability under the eleventh amendment.
* * *

As the Supreme Court has noted, 'an agent's liability for
torts committed by him cannot be avoided by pleading the
direction or authorization of the principal. The agent is
himself liable whether or not he has been authorized or even
directed to commit the tort.' Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 113
n.23. Accordingly, the Court has consistently held that the
eleventh amendment does not protect state officials from
personal liability when their actions violate a federal law,
even though state law purports to require such actions . . .
[E]very case before the Supreme Court in which 'under color of
state law' provisions were invoked 'involved action taken
either in strict pursuance of some specific command of state
law or within the scope of executive discretion in the
administration of state laws.'
Id.

at 921.
The court went on to point out that none of the authorities

relied upon in an earlier decision, "stands for the proposition
that state officials cannot be personally liable for carrying out
an unconstitutional state policy."
7

Id.

at 923.

In view of the

foregoing, the fact Defendants acted under the guise of a state
taxing scheme does not change the characterization of this suit
from an individual capacity action.
C.

State and City Taxing Officials are not Entitled to
Qualified Immunity as a Hatter of Law.
1.

Congress has Preempted Defendants' Affirmative
Defense of Qualified Immunity Since State Taxing
Officials were not Accorded the Defense of
Qualified Immunity in 1871, When § 1983 was
Enacted.

Defendants1
incorrectly

discussion

regarding

qualified

immunity

assumes that all government officials, under all

circumstances, are entitled to claim qualified immunity. The U.S.
Supreme Court has expressly rejected

this premise.

Certain

government officials are entitled to this defense when an action is
brought pursuant to § 1983, but, state taxing officials are not
included in this group.
The United States Supreme Court in Felder

v. Casey,

487 U.S.

131 (1988) , discussed the applicability of the immunity defense in
actions brought pursuant to § 1983. The Court stated that "[a]ny
assessment of the applicability of a state law to federal civil
rights litigation . . . must be made in light of the purpose and
nature of the federal right."

Id.

at 139.

The court expressly

stated:
Accordingly, we have held that a state law that immunizes
government conduct otherwise subject to suit under § 1983 is
preempted, even where the federal civil rights litigation
takes place in state court, because the application of the
state immunity law would thwart the congressional remedy....
Id.

(citation omitted).

The Court then recognized that Congress

has provided some immunities for certain state officials.
8

Id.

However, state tax officials are not among those state officials
entitled to claim qualified immunity.
The Supreme Court's decision in Tower v. Glover,
(1984), is dispositive on this issue. In Tower,

467 U.S. 914

the plaintiff was

convicted of robbery. Subsequent to his conviction, the plaintiff
brought a § 1983 suit against the public defender seeking punitive
damages on grounds the public defender had conspired with various
state

officials

to

secure the plaintiff's

conviction.

The

defendant's motion to dismiss was granted by the district court on
grounds that public defenders enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983
liability.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district

court's decision and the case came before the Supreme Court.

The

Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the district court.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, "[o]n its face § 1983
admits no immunities." Id.

at 920. The court further stated that

it has recognized that certain officials are entitled to absolute
or qualified immunity.
"[s]ection
inquiry

Id.

The Court noted, however, that

1983 immunities are

'predicated upon a considered

into the immunity historically

accorded the relevant

official at common law and the interests behind it."1 Id.,

citing

Imbler

v. Pachtman,

Allen,

466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984). The Court stated that an official

424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976).

See also Pulliam

v.

is entitled to claim immunity only if, as a threshold matter, the
official" was accorded immunity from tort actions at common law
when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871." Tower,

476 U.S. at

920. The Court in Tower rejected the defendant's claim of immunity
9

stating that "[n]o immunity for public defenders . . . existed at
common law because there was, of course, no such office or position
in existence at that time." Id.
in Tower,

at 921.3 Like the public defender

state tax officials did not enjoy any immunity at common

law "when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871."
The law is well-settled that a party claiming immunity has the
burden of proving they are entitled to the defense. See Laverne
Corning,

v.

376 F.Supp 836 (S.D. N.Y. 1974), aff fd. 522 F.2d 1144 (2nd

Cir. 1975) ;4

Yet, Defendants do not claim any court has held that

state taxing officials were entitled to claim immunity from suit at
common law when § 1983 was enacted in 1871.5

This court should

reject Defendants' claim of immunity as a matter of law.
Even if this court is persuaded that state taxing officials
enjoyed immunity from suit in 1871, its inquiry is not finished.
In Tower,

the Court stated: "If an official was accorded immunity

3

Accord, Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 650
(1970) ("In sum, we can discern no 'tradition so well grounded in
history and reason' that would warrant the conclusion that in
enacting § 1 of the Civil Rights Act, the 42d Congress sub
silentio
extended to municipalities a qualified immunity based on the good
faith of their officers").
4

See also Bauer v. Norris,
713 F2d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1983);
De Vasto v. Faherty,
658 F.2d 859, 865 (1st Cir. 1981); Tanner v.
Hardy, 764 F.2d 1024, 1027 (4th Cir. 1985); Alexander v.
Alexander,
706 F.2d 751, 754 (6th Cir. 1983); Cook v. City of Topeka, 232 Kan.
334, 654 P.2d 953 (1982); McGrath v. State,
312 N.W.2d 438 (Minn.
1981).
5

In fact, at the time of the enactment of § 1983, the leading
tax case was the landmark decision of Osborn v. Bank of the
United
States,
22 U.S. 738, 859 (1824), where the court held that, "[i]f
the law of the State of Ohio be repugnant to the constitution, or
to a law of the United States made in pursuance thereto . . . [it
can] furnish no authority to those who took or those who received
the [taxes] for which the suit was instituted."
10

from tort actions at common law . . .

in 1871, the court next

considers whether § 1983's history or purposes nonetheless counsel
against recognizing the same immunities in § 1983 actions."
467 U.S. at 920, citing Imbler

v. Pachtman,

Tower,

424 U.S. at 424-429.

Defendants have set forth no explanation as to why the history and
purpose of § 1983 favor the recognition of qualified immunity in
this dispute.
The history and purpose of § 1983 counsel against the defense
in the present action.

The Supreme Court has stated that "the

central objective of [§ 1983] is to ensure that individuals whose
federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged may recover
damages or secure injunctive relief."
citing Burnett

v. Grattan,

Felder,

487 U.S. at 139,

468 U.S. 42, 55 (1984).

"Section 1983

accomplishes this goal by creating a form of liability that, by its
very nature, runs only against a specific class of defendants:
government bodies and their officials." Felder,

487 U.S. at 141.

In the

subjected

instant action, Plaintiffs have been

to a

discriminatory tax in contravention of a federal statute and the
United

States

Constitution.

In

addition,

Defendants

have

consistently taken the legal position that, despite Plaintiffs'
established right to refunds under Utah law and the United States
Constitution, they will not grant refunds to Plaintiffs even though
similarly

circumstanced

individuals

perfectly analogous circumstances.

are

awarded

refunds

in

If Defendants are immune from

suit, Plaintiffs will be deprived of their right of redress under
§ 1983 for violations of their federal constitutional and statutory
11

rights.
This is an action in which qualified immunity should not be
recognized. This case is unlike those where qualified immunity has
been recognized.

This is not a case in which liability is sought

from an official as a result of violations of vague or complicated
legal concepts such as "probable cause," or "cruel and unusual
punishment."

This case involves a violation

language" of a federal statute. Davis

of

"the plain

at 808.

Defendants compounded this violation by ignoring the mandate
of Davis

and collecting an unlawful tax liability even after the

announcement

of

the

Davis

decision.

The

well-founded

justifications underlying the doctrine of qualified immunity will
be undermined if Defendants are permitted to successfully invoke
the defense in this case.
The Tower Court expressly stated that, despite "well founded"
concerns of the possibility that an official's effectiveness may be
impaired by the threat of § 1983 actions, the Court does not "have
a license to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the
interest of what we judge to be sound policy." Tower,
922-23.

467 U.S. at

The Court held that:

It is for Congress to determine whether § 1983 litigation has
become too burdensome to state or federal institutions and, if
so, what remedial action is appropriate.
Id.

at 923 (emphasis added).

Only Congress has the authority to

create a qualified immunity defense for state taxing officials.

12

Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
Defendants are not
Entitled to Qualified Immunity as a Result of Their
Nondiscretionary, Ministerial Acts.

2.

Even those officials who are not precluded under Tower, supra,
from asserting the defense of qualified immunity must satisfy other
requirements before they can raise this defense.
Fitzgerald,

In Harlow

v.

457 U.S. 800 (1982), the United States Supreme Court

held that "government officials performing discretionary functions
may be shielded from liability for civil damages in a § 1983 action
by the doctrine of qualified immunity."

Id.

at 818 (emphasis

added). As a condition precedent to invoking qualified immunity as
a defense under Harlow,

Defendants must show their conduct was in

furtherance of a discretionary act. In Davis v. Scherer,

468 U.S.

183, 196 n.14 (1984), the Court unequivocally stated that, "the
Court's doctrine grants qualified immunity to officials in the
performance of discretionary, but not ministerial functions."
Breault

v.

Chairman

of Bd. of Fire

Comm'rs.,

In

401 Mass. 26, 513

N.E.2d 1277 (1987), the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized the
defense of qualified immunity "is available, as a threshold matter
under Harlow,

only where the defendant official was 'performing

discretionary functions.'"
Harlow,

Breault,

513 N.E.2d at 1281, citing

457 U.S. at 818.

In the instant action, Defendants suggest they should escape
liability

by

claiming

that,

"The

State's

reliance

on

long

established and unchallenged state law was reasonable. At the time
the actions complained of took place, they were lawful." Df Reply
Br p. 36.

Defendants apparently are asserting their conduct
13

involved no discretion and was, instead, ministerial in nature.
This

was

precisely

the

issue

Massachusetts in Breault.

before

the

Supreme

Court

of

There, a firefighter brought a § 1983

action against the defendant chairman of the board of fire commissioners seeking damages against the commissioner in his individual capacity.

The commissioner, like Defendants here, raised

qualified immunity as a defense. The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's denial of the defendant's claim of qualified immunity
on the basis the defendant was acting in a ministerial function
when he committed the alleged civil rights violation. Breault,
N.E.2d

at 1281.

513

The court, in reaching this determination,

reasoned that the statute upon which the defendant acted in
pursuance thereof, "mandated" the defendant's course of action.
Id.

at 1282.

enjoyed

no

The court concluded that, "[b]ecause the defendant
statutory

discretionary

authority

to

reinstatement, he acted in a ministerial capacity.
properly denied."
Therefore,

withhold

Immunity was

Id.
accepting,

arguendo,

Defendants'

conduct

as

ministerial, they are not entitled to claim qualified immunity as
a defense.
3.

This

As Stated by the Supreme Court in Davis,
the Lav
Violated by Defendants was Both "Settled" and
"Unmistakable".
Therefore, Defendants are not
Entitled to Claim Qualified Immunity.

court

should

entertain

the

merits

of

Defendants'

qualified immunity defense only if Defendants convince the court
that (1) state tax officials were accorded the defense of qualified
immunity in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted; and (2) that Defendant's
14

violative acts were not ministerial in nature, i.e., involved more
than "minimal discretion".

In any event, Defendants are not

entitled to qualified immunity since, as the Davis

decision itself

unequivocally states, the rights violated by Defendants in the
instant action were clearly established.
(a)

The Clearly Established Standard.

Defendants have misconstrued the degree to which Plaintiffs'
rights must be established in order for this court to accept the
defense of qualified immunity. Df Reply Bf p. 35. In Anderson

v.

Creighton,

483 U.S. 635 (1987), the United States Supreme Court

concluded

that

an

official

can be held

to violate

clearly

established rights even though the "very action in question" was
not previously held to be unlawful.
As stated in Harlow,

Id.

at 639.

"a reasonably competent public official

should know the law governing his conduct."
819.

Harlow,

457 U.S. at

Public officials are also charged with knowledge of the

meanings of federal statutes, see Cole v. Railroad

Retirement

Bd.,

289 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1961); the contents of federal regulations,
see FDIC v. Merrill,
see United

States

332 U.S. 380 (1947); and applicable state law,
v. Yeazell,

After the Davis

382 U.S. 341 (1966).

case was issued in March of 1989, Defendants

stand defenseless to claim they acted reasonably in collecting
unlawful taxes.

Plaintiffs sought §1983 relief for the 1988 tax

year because the Supreme Court had spoken and Defendants still
refused

to acknowledge and grant to Plaintiffs the "rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of
15

the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whatever argument Defendants
had prior to March 1989 justifying their position, evaporated when
the Supreme Court spoke.
The test this Court should implement is whether or not the
rights afforded Plaintiffs under 4 U.S.C. § 111 and the United
States Constitution were clearly established when violated by
Defendants.

The test is not, as Defendants maintain, whether the

state law under which the Defendants acted was clearly established
or ever called into doubt.

It is, therefore, irrelevant how many

states had

taxing

schemes which violated

the rights of its

citizens.6

Even if all fifty states had discriminatory taxing

schemes like that present in Utah, Plaintiffs1 rights under the
Constitution and § 111 would be no less clearly established.

In

fact, the conclusion that Plaintiffs1 constitutional and statutory
rights were clearly established even before the U.S. Supreme Court
spoke in Davis

is supported by the fact that there was no final

authority which sustained the principle that federal retirees1
benefits could be discriminatorily taxed.

6

As noted by the United States Supreme Court," . . . where the
power to tax is not unlimited, validity is not established by the
mere imposition of a tax." Mullaney v. Anderson,
342 U.S. 415,
418.
It seems state legislatures and the tax authorities who
advise them err on the side of parochial interest. An example of
this is the discriminatory taxing schemes, one of which was at
issue in ATA, Inc. v. Scheiner,
107 S.Ct. 2829 (1987), relentlessly
enforced by several states against out-of-state truckers. These
schemes were not saved by the defense that everyone else is doing
it. In a similar fashion, the United States Supreme Court knew
full well that many states were violating 4 U.S.C. § 111 when it
awarded Mr. Davis retroactive relief because the list appears in
the decision.
See, Davis,
489 U.S. at 822 n.3. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
16

(b) As Davis Explained, Plaintiffs' Statutory and
Constitutional Rights Violated by Defendants
were Clearly Established.
This court need look no further than the Davis

decision in

deciding whether or not Plaintiffs1 rights were clearly established. Davis

is replete with analysis and express language which

unequivocally states that the law in this area has been clearly
established. It is significant to note from the outset that it was
the defendant, the State of Michigan, that attempted to persuade
the Davis

Court to depart from clearly established law.

The

Supreme Court rejected the State's invitation:
The state offers no reason for departing from this settled
law, and we decline to do so.
489 U.S. at 815 (emphasis added).7

Davis.,

The statute Defendants violated, 4 U.S.C. § 111, was enacted
in 1939 as part of the Public Salary Tax Act. Davis,
810.

Davis

489 U.S. at

makes this dispositive statement:

The overall meaning of § 111 is unmistakable:
it waives
whatever immunity past and present federal employees would
otherwise enjoy from state taxation . . . of
retirement
benefits . . . paid on account of their employment with the
Federal Government, except to the extent that such taxation
discriminates on account of the source of compensation.
Id.

(emphasis added).

The Court specifically stated that any

other "hypertechnical reading" of the statute would be "implausible
at best." Id.
of law.

at 810-811. Davis did not announce a new principle

It merely affirmed that § ill, by its plain language,

'The phrase, settled law, has been interpreted to mean
"unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S.
308, 329 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
17

states that the plaintiff in Davis,

like the retirees in the

instant action, could not be subject to a discriminatory state tax.
By itself, the Davis

decision is sufficient for this court to rule

that the rights set forth in § ill were clearly established.
The Davis
Plaintiffs1

Court emphasized

rights

are by

just how clearly

explaining

that

the

established

long-standing

principle of intergovernmental tax immunity, as codified in § 111,
had its "genesis in McCulloch
579 (1819)."

Davis,

v. Maryland,

489 U.S. at 810.

4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed.

In McCulloch,

the United

States Supreme Court held that the State of Maryland could not
impose a discriminatory tax on a federal instrumentality of the
United States.

The Davis

decision of Graves

v.

court further noted that after the 1939

New York

ex rel.

O'Keefe,

306 U.S. 466

(1939) :
[IIntergovernmental tax immunity barred only those taxes that
were imposed directly on one sovereign by the other or that
discriminated against a sovereign of those with whom it dealt.
489 U.S. at 811 (Emphasis added).8

Davis,
that

"the

nondiscrimination

component

The Davis
of

the

immunity doctrine has, from the time of McCulloch

court stated
constitutional
v.

Maryland,

barred taxes that 'operat[e] so as to discriminate against the
Government or those with whom it deals.1"
omitted).

Id.

at 812. (citations

The Court stated that § 111 was drafted "against the

backdrop" of the Supreme Court's tax cases and, as such, is
8

The Court in Davis makes specific mention of the fact that
just prior to the adoption of 4 U.S.C. § 111 in 1939 it was
"unclear whether state taxation of federal employees was still
barred by intergovernmental tax immunity." Davis, at 811-812. The
enactment of 4 U.S.C. § 111 resolved this uncertainty.
Id.
18

"coextensive

with

the

modern

intergovernmental tax immunity."

constitutional
Id.

doctrine

of

at 813.

Moreover, in rejecting Michigan's argument that individuals
should not receive protection of the constitutional doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity, the Court in Davis

expressly stated

Id.

at 814 (emphasis

that "all precedent is to the contrary."
added).

This statement evidences two crucial aspects in favor of

finding that the law affirmed in Davis

was clearly established.

First, it shows the existence of case law sufficiently on point.
The Court lists no fewer than five Supreme Court tax cases dating
back to 1842 in support of the proposition that federal retirees
may not be taxed discriminatorily.

Id.

at 814-815.

Second, it

indicates that the law in this area has been consistent, or in
other words, that there was no split of authority as to this issue.
Id.

These two points further show why the Court phrased the law as

"settled."9
The five Supreme Court tax decisions cited by the Davis

Court

have one consistent theme: whenever a state attempted to place a
discriminatory tax upon an entity associated with the United
States, regardless of the basis, the tax was struck down as
unconstitutional.
Based upon the "settled rule" espoused in the cases cited in
Davis,

it is inconsistent for Defendants to assert before this
9

The

word

establish."

"settle"

is

defined
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as
(5th

a
ed.

term

meaning

1979).

"to

Thus, in

stating that the rule affirmed in Davis was "settled," the Court
has conclusively stated that, contrary to Defendants assertions,
the rule was clearly established.
19

court that the decision in Davis

could not have been foreshadowed.

Consistent with the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity
and/or 4 U.S.C. § 111, each and every time a state attempted to
discriminatorily tax a person or an entity associated with the
federal government, the Supreme Court invalidated the tax.
Defendants would have this court believe the Davis

decision

was reached in a vacuum when, in fact, just the opposite is true.
It was an

inevitable and unmistakable conclusion

existing precedent.

based upon

The Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 not only

gave Congress1 consent to nondiscriminatory taxation of federal
employees, but also amended the Internal Revenue Code to, for the
first time, tax compensation for personal service

"including

personal service as an officer or employee of a state, or any
political subdivision thereof . . . ."
1939, Title I, § 1.

Public Salary Tax Act of

The same legislation specified that "[t]he

terms used in this act shall have the same meaning when used in
Chapter I of the Internal Revenue Code."
The term

, Id.

Title II, § 206.

"compensation for personal service" as used

in the

Internal Revenue Code at the time of the adoption of the Public
Salary Tax Act of 1939 included pensions of retired government
employees.
In addition, based upon the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity, state pensions had consistently been excluded from
federal income taxation under the Internal Revenue Code prior to
the passage of the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939.

See T.D. 2831,

21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 180 (1920) (Treasury Regulation under
20

the

Internal Revenue

Code defined

compensation

for personal

services to include "retired pay of federal and other officers, and
pensions or retiring allowances paid by the United States or
private persons.")
4.

Plaintiffs are Entitled to Recover Damages from
Defendants for their Continued Enforcement of the
Scheme After the Decision in Davis Was Announced.

If, arguendo,

as Defendants assert, the rule of law was first

established on March 28, 1989, the date of the Davis

decision, the

individual Defendants are individually liable for their conduct
after March 28, 1989.
In Arebaugh

v. Dalton,

730 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1984), the court

reversed and remanded the district court's decision to grant the
defendant government official summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity notwithstanding the recentness of a United
In Arebaugh,

States Supreme Court holding.

the defendant's

complained of actions that occurred only twelve days after similar
actions by another official were declared improper by the Supreme
Court. The Arebaugh

court noted that "[t]welve days may well turn

out to have been sufficient time for someone with a direct interest
to have learned of, read and digested the
holding."

Id.

at 973.10

court in Arebaugh

[Supreme Court's]

Here, Defendants had twenty days.

The

went on to state:

Obviously, the office of the Commonwealth's Attorney General
called upon regularly to represent the agency in which the
defendants served, had at least a responsibility to currently
10

Here, of course, there is no question Defendants were aware
of Davis and had analyzed its impact on Utah. See press release
dated on April 5, 1989. R. 595.
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keep up to date in the legal area in which the case . . .
fell. To escape liability, the defendants, with the burden of
proof reposing on them, had the responsibility to demonstrate
that there existed a good faith explanation either for the
failure of those responsible to know of the decision . .
. or, if those responsible were in fact aware of the decision,
for the subsequent failure to communicate that knowledge to
the prison officials.
Id.

at 972.11

Similarly, in Ware v. Heyne,

575 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.

1978) , prison officials were held liable for failing to give a
prisoner written notice of charges against him in advance of a
prison disciplinary proceeding.

The prisoner's right to advance

written notice was clearly established in an opinion decided two
months before the disciplinary proceeding, but the opinion was not
published in the West Publishing Co. advance sheets until two
months after the disciplinary proceeding.

The court found the

right at issue was clearly established despite the defendant's
ignorance of the unreported opinion.
in Muzychka
court

held

v. Tyler,
that

an

The same result was reached

563 F. Supp. 1061 (E. D. Pa. 1983), where the
alleged

illegal

search

violated

clearly

established law based upon the fact that the Supreme Court had
decided a case "very much on point" approximately "three weeks
before the search occurred."

Id.

at 1065.

In Missouri, one of the states affected by Davis,

the attorney

general issued a formal opinion on April 17, 1989, advising the
Department of Revenue that the state's taxing scheme was "invalid

"it should be emphasized that prior to the Supreme Court's
holding relied upon by the Fourth Circuit in Arebaugh,
the lower
courts were split on the implicated issue. AreJbaugh, 73 F.2d at
973 n.3. Here, no such split existed. Davis merely reaffirmed
"settled law."
22

and discriminatory" and that the monies collected under the scheme
must be refunded, even for prior years.

As such, Defendants are

not entitled to assert qualified immunity for any taxes collected
after the Davis
5.

decision was announced.12
Defendants have Denied Rights Secured to Plaintiffs
Under the Laws of Utah and the Constitution of the
United States in Violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The law is settled that violations of a Plaintiffs1 rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment are actionable under 42 U.S.C. §
Hague v.

1983.
Halden,

CIO,

See also Hoffman

307 U.S. 496 (1939).

268 F.2d 280, 293 (9th Cir. 1959); R.W. Agnew v.

Compton,

239 F.2d 226, 236 (9th Cir. 1957); French

City

v. Heyne,

v.
of
547

F.2d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 1976).
Plaintiffs have a statutory refund right under U.C.A. § 59-10529.

The term "overpayment" is construed by reference to the

federal analog found in § 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code. Under
§ 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code, "overpayments" arising because
of payment

of a tax

later held to be unconstitutional

are

recoverable in the same manner as other payments, i.e., recovery
may be had

if a timely claim

is filed.

Contrary

to what

Defendants1 now implicitly assert, there is no authority which
suggests, let alone holds, that the Utah legislature has carved out
an exemption from the unqualified statutory right to refund which
would enable Defendants, when they so choose, to deny refunds
because Defendants feel a tax collected
12

in violation of the

It is undisputed that this tax liability was not due until
April 17, 1989.
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constitution does not have to be given back retroactively.
the opposite is true. In Jones

v. Liberty

Glass

Co.,

Just

332 U.S. 524,

531 (1947), the Court said:
[W]e read the word 'overpayment1 in its usual sense, as
meaning any payment in excess of that which is properly due.
Such an excess payment may be traced to an error in mathematics or in judgment or in interpretation of facts or law.
And the error may be committed by the taxpayer or by the
revenue agents. Whatever the reason, the payment of more than
is rightfully due is what characterizes an overpayment.
In the instant case, Defendants have not appealed the trial
court's

ruling

that

Utah's

discriminatory

scheme

is

unconstitutional. Moreover, the law is abundantly clear that it is
these Defendants who are charged with the responsibility to pay
refunds. See, e.g. U.C.A. § 59-1-210(5) and U.C.A. § 59-10-529(6).
However, these Defendants have announced and have, in fact, denied
Plaintiffs' their unqualified refund right otherwise available and
routinely honored in the case of any other similarly circumstanced
taxpayer who has "overpaid" his tax.

For a discussion of this

issue directly on point, see Hackman v. Director

of Revenue,

111

S.W.2d 77 (Mo. banc 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 718 (1990).
The denial of refunds by Defendants in this case violates the
Supreme Court's declaration of "equality" in Davis,

supra, and is,

in itself, unconstitutional because the result of such a decision
would be to deny Plaintiffs tax treatment equal to that afforded
the favored class of state retirees for the tax years 1985 through
1988.

As noted by Justice Bandeis in Iowa-Des

v. Bennett,

Moines Nat'l.

Bank.

284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931):

A taxpayer who has been subjected to discriminatory taxation
through the favoring of others in violation of federal law,
24

cannot be required himself to assume the burden of seeking an
increase of the taxes which the other should have paid . . .
The petitioners are entitled to obtain in these suits
refund of the excess of taxes exacted from them.
See also Gosnell

Dev. Corp. v. Arizona

Dept.

of Revenue,

154 Ariz.

539, 744 P.2d 451, 454 (App. 1987) (a refund of taxes was the only
remedy available to cure unequal treatment of taxpayers).
D.

Plaintiffs are Not Required to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies.

Defendants have raised as a defense that Plaintiffs are
required to exhaust administrative remedies. Df Reply bf p.44. The
law is settled that Plaintiffs in a § 1983 action are not required
to exhaust administrative remedies.
1.

In Felder

The Supreme Court has Expressly Stated that Only
Congress has Authority to Place Exhaustion
Requirements on a § 1983 Claim.
v. Casey,

487 U.S. 131 (1988) , the Supreme Court

held that failure to resort to administrative procedures may not be
asserted to bar or restrict a § 1983 action brought in state court.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, holding that § 1983 preempted the Wisconsin Statute.
Felder,

487 U.S. at 138.13

The Court ruled:
[T]he notice provision operates, in part, as an exhaustion
requirement, in that it forces claimants to seek satisfaction
15

The Felder court expressly rejected the Wisconsin Courtfs
reliance on its prior decision in Kramer v. Horton, 128 Wis.2d 404,
383 N.W.2d 54, cert, denied. 479 U.S. 918 (1986), which stated that
"where state administrative remedies are adequate and available, a
plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim is required to exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to commencing suit in state court."
See Felder at 147-148, rev'cr. Felder 139 Wis.2d at 622-23, citing,
Kramer, 128 Wis.2d at 419.
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in the first instance from the governmental defendant. We
think it plain that congress never intended that those injured
by governmental wrongdoers could be required, as a condition
of recovery, to submit their claims to the government
responsible for their injuries.
Id.

at 142.
The Court saw no reason to suppose Congress contemplated

plaintiffs who bring a § 1983 claim in state court "could be
required to seek redress in the first instance from the very state
officials whose hostility to those rights precipitated
injuries."

Id.

their

at 147.

The court noted further:
These [§ 1983] causes of action . . . exist independent of any
other legal or administrative relief that may be available as
a matter of federal or state law.
They are judicially
enforceable in the first instance.
Id.

at 148. See also Patsy

v. Bd. of Regents,

457 U.S. 496 (1982)

(holding that § 1983 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to initiating § 1983 actions in
federal court).
2.

There is No Adequate
Available to Plaintiffs.

Administrative

Remedy

Defendants1 assertion that Plaintiffs should have exhausted
administrative remedies in pursuing their § 1983 civil rights
action mistakenly

assumes the commission has jurisdiction to

resolve civil rights claims.
(a)

Plaintiffs1

The State Tax Commission Lacks Subject Matter
Jurisdiction to Entertain a § 1983 Claim
Brought Against Defendants in Their Individual
Capacities.

§ 1983 damage claim seeks recovery from the

Defendants in their individual capacities.
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There simply is no

statutory authority which confers subject matter jurisdiction upon
the State Tax Commission to entertain this type of civil rights
action.
(b) The State Tax Commission Lacks Authority to
Declare a Taxing Scheme Unconstitutional.
It is well established that an administrative agency lacks
authority to rule on the constitutionality of a statute.
e.g. , 73 C.J.S., Public

Administrative

Law and Procedure,

See,

§ 48, at

491 ("The administrative process cannot resolve a constitutional
attack on a statute, rule or regulation, and it is for the courts,
and not an administrative body, to determine the constitutionality
of a statute").

The leading treatise on administrative agencies

unequivocally states that "we do not commit to administrative
agencies

the

legislation.

power

to

determine

the

constitutionality

Only the courts have authority to take action which

runs counter to the expressed will of the legislative body."
DAVIS,

of

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE,

3

§ 20.04 at 74 (1985).

The Supreme Court has likewise held that an administrative
body can only be expected to entertain issues where the agency
proceeding involves "no remnant of [a] constitutional question."
Public

Util.

Comm'n.

v. United

States,

355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958).

There also appears to be universal agreement among state courts,
including Utah, which have squarely addressed this issue that
administrative

agencies

lack

authority

to

pass

on

the

constitutionality of a statute. See, full argument at pp. 75-79 of
Plaintiffs1 brief.
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(c)

In Light of Defendants' Predisposition Against
Granting
Plaintiffs' Relief,
Resort
to
Administrative Procedures Would Be Futile.

It is widely recognized that where resort to administrative
procedures would be futile, such a burden cannot be imposed on a
party.

It is uncontested that the Commission issued a widely

publicized

press

release

shortly

after

the

Davis

decision

announcing its position with regard to denying refunds under

Davis.

The Commission has never backed away from that position either in
public or in this litigation.
In, Walker

Bank & Trust

Co. v.

Taylor,

15 Utah 2d 234, 390

P.2d 592 (1964), the court stated, "The question here involved,
being strictly one of law, is for the courts and an appeal to the
Board of Examiners would have been futile and useless."

See full

argument in Plaintiffs' brief at pp. 75-79.
With

respect

to

each

claim

in

the

amended

complaint,

Plaintiffs were excused from exhausting administrative remedies by
specific factual findings made by the trial court.

These factual

findings may only be overturned upon a finding of abuse of
discretion by the trial court.

Defendants have not claimed the

trial court abused its discretion in ruling there were "indications
that the Utah State Tax Commission has preliminarily decided that
Davis

v. Michigan

mandate refunds

Dep't

of Treasury,

in Utah."

489 U.S. 803 (1989) does not

R. 252.

Any resort before the

Commission would be futile. As stated previously, the Utah State
Tax Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction to vindicate
Plaintiff's § 1983 damage claims because they are brought against
28

Defendants

in

their

individual

capacities.

Similarly,

the

Commission lacks authority to declare a statute unconstitutional.
These factors, standing alone, would be sufficient for a finding of
futility.

They do not, however, stand alone.

Defendants have summarily denied claims for refunds made by
members of the putative class.

R. 598, 917-925.

Moreover,

Defendants1 counsel have repeatedly asserted that Defendants have
no legal obligation to pay refunds for any tax year prior to 1989.
Df Reply Bf p.35.

Defendant's counsel are the same attorneys who

advise Defendants with regard to legal matters at the State Tax
Commission and who would represent the State of Utah's interests in
a hearing before that administrative body.

These additional

factors demonstrate that a proceeding before the Commission in the
instant action would be futile.
Defendants'
administrative

assertion

remedies

that

Plaintiffs

before bringing

a

§

should
1983

exhaust

action

is

misplaced since exhaustion is not required for § 1983 actions and
because there is no showing the trial court abused its discretion
in relieving Plaintiffs of any exhaustion requirements.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' appeal should be denied and this matter remanded
to the trial court for the purpose of issuing an order to the Utah
State Tax Commission to issue refunds to members of the class, plus
interest, costs and attorney's fees.
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30
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APPENDIX

TABLE OF CURRENT STATUS OF FEDERAL RETIREE TAX REFUND LITIGATION
IN OTHER STATES (as of 03/28/92)
STATE

TRIAL COURT OR
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

STATE SUPREME
COURT

AL

Refunds granted per
state refund statute.

AZ

Partial refunds granted. Pending (Court of
Appeals).
|Refunds granted per
state refund statute.

Upheld refunds.

CO

Refunds granted.

Upheld refunds.

IA

Pending.

KS

Refunds denied to
military retirees.

Affirmed trial court.

KT

Received injunction.

Pending.

MI

! The director of Revenue
denied refunds as he had
no authority to declare
a state law unconstitutional.
Refunds granted.

COMMENTS

Pending (Court of
Appeals).

AK

MO

U.S. SUPREME
COURT

Reversed and granted
refunds pursuant to
the state refund
statute.
Upheld refunds.

Petition for Cert,
filed in 1991. Now
pending.
Refunds now being
processed. Claims
involved only
military retirees.

Cert, granted; oral
arguments heard
03/04/92; pending.

Denied Petition for
Cert.

Refunds have been
paid.

STATE

TRIAL COURT OR
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

STATE SUPREME
COURT

U.S. SUPREME
COURT

COMMENTS

MT

Denied refunds per
Chevron.

Affirmed trial court.

MS

Refunds granted per
state refund statute.

Pending.

NC

Refunds granted.

Reversed trial court
per Chevron analysis.

NM

Granted refunds per
state refund statute.

No appeal.

Refunds paid.

NY

Refunds granted.

Reversed trial court per
Chevron.

Appeal to State
Supreme Court

OK

State Tax Commission
denied refunds per
Chevron - non-retroactivity.

Pending.

OR

Refunds denied.

Remanded to trial court
for further proceedings.

SC

Refunds granted per
state refund statute.

Reversed trial court per Cert, granted,
Chevron analysis vacated and remanded
non-retroactivity.
06/91 per Beam. A
second petition for
cert, was filed in
03/92 after the
State Supreme Court
on remand refused to
apply Beam; Cert,
pending.

Petition for Cert,
filed.

Petition for Cert,
filed.

STATE

TRIAL COURT OR
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

STATE SUPREME
COURT

UT

Refunds granted per
state refund statute.

Pending.

VA

Denied refunds per
Chevron - non-retroactivity.

Affirmed trial court.

WI

Pending.

Appeal on procedural
issues onlyf remanded to
trial court for further
proceedings.

WV

Refunds granted; misc.
issues remain.

U.S. SUPREME
COURT

Cert, granted,
vacated and remanded
per Beam. A second
petition for Cert,
was filed 11/91;
Cert, pending.

COMMENTS

LIST OF CITATIONS TO OPINIONS IN FEDERAL RETIREE
TAX REFUND LITIGATION IN OTHER STATES
AL

Rinehart v. Sizemore. CV-89-704-M (App. B).

AZ

Bonn v. Waddell. TX-89-00050 (Ariz. Tax. Ct).

AK

Pledger v. Bosnik. 811 S.W. 2d 286 (Ark. 1991), petition for cert, filed No. 91-375.

CO

Kuhn v. Colorado. 817 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1991).

IA

McManus v. Iowa. No. C89-179 (N.D. Iowa); Hagge v. Iowa. LA 20859 Linn County.

KS

Barker v. State. 815 P.2d 46 (Kan. 1991), cert, granted, oral arguments were heard
on March 4, 1991, by the United States Supreme Court No. 91-611.

KT

Gossum v. Kentucky. No. 89-CI-248 (Marshall Cir. Ct.).

MI

Fongerv. Dept. of Treasury.
February 4, 1992).

MO

Hackman v. Director of Revenue. 771 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1989), petition for cert,
denied, 110 S.Ct. 718 (1991).

MT

Sheehy v. Montana. 820 P.2d 1257 (Mont. 1991).

MS

Todd v. Tax Comm'n. No. 139915 and Winstead v. Marx. No. 141652 (Chancery Ct.
1st Jud. Dist. of Hines County).

NC

Swanson v. North Carolina. 407 S.E. 2d 791 (N.C. 1991), petition for rehearing
denied.

NM

Burns v. New Mexico. No. SF 89-1314(c)(lst Jud. Dist. Santa Fe County, April 5,
1990).

NY

Duffy v. Wetzler.

N.W.2d

A.2d

(Mich. Ct. App.

(N.Y. App. Div. January 15,

1992).
OK

Worrell v. Tax Comm'n. No. DR-46 (Okla. Tax Division).

OR
SC

Nutbrown v. Munn. 811 P.2d 131 (Or. 1991), petition for cert, pending, No. 91-457.
Bass v. South Carolina. 395 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 1990), cert, granted, vacated and
remanded 111 S.Ct. 2881 (1991); the State Supreme Court issued a second opinion
and there is now a second petition for cert, pending at the United States Supreme
Court.

UT

Brumley v. Tax Comm'n. No. 89-0903618 (Utah Dist. Ct).

VA

Harper v. Virginia. 401 S.E.2d 868 (Va. 1991), cert, granted, vacated and remanded,
111 S.Ct. 2881 (1991), 410 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 1991), second petition for cert, pending
No. 91-794.

WI

Hogan v. Musolf. 471 N.W.2d 216 (Wis. 1991), petition for cert, pending.

WV

Brown v. Mierke. CV90-C-3341 (Circuit Court of Kanawha County).
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